Statement of Joseph J. Krol
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U.S. Department of Energy
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Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, my name is Joseph Krol and I am the Associate Administrator for Emergency Operations at the National Nuclear Security Administration. I am pleased to have this opportunity to present an overview of our nuclear incident response capabilities, emphasizing how we conduct our mission working with and supporting other United States Government agencies with a nuclear/radiological counterterrorism mission.

As I begin, I want to emphasize that it is our strong inter-relationship and close coordination with law enforcement entities and the intelligence community that enables our joint success in executing the United States counter-terrorism mission. Through pre-event planning and response coordination, the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Defense and Energy have demonstrated on-going success in event execution as exemplified by National Security Special Events, such as the National political conventions, where National Nuclear Security Administration assets supported both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and United States Secret Service; Special Events, such as the Olympics and National Football League Super Bowls, where National Nuclear Security Administration assets supported the Federal Bureau of Investigation and numerous other federal agencies; and a variety of other scheduled and unscheduled events, to include Federal Bureau of Investigation /Joint Terrorism Task Force requests for technical support within a city.

It is important to note that the equity the National Nuclear Security Administration brings to bear on the nuclear/radiological counter-terrorism problem is technical expertise. Our core competencies include; (1) knowledge of U.S. nuclear weapons, radiological dispersal devices, and improvised nuclear devices with specific specialties in spectroscopy, device modeling, radiography and device assessment technology; (2) knowledge of technical operations such as explosive ordinance disposal procedures and techniques for device access, disablement, render safe, weapon recovery, and final disposition; and (3) knowledge of technical support requirements such as attribution, weapons effects, health and treatment capabilities and the technical evaluation of consequence management radiological data.

Specific to the nuclear/radiological counter-terrorism mission, we offer mature technical capabilities to support Federal law enforcement to search for, locate, and render safe improvised nuclear devices. In order to support the increased number of requests since 9-11 for timely nuclear/radiological search, we have grown our search capability from 2 search teams in one centralized location to 29 teams in numerous locations spread across the United States. If an incident requires a surge, we also have the capability to train and equip 60 searchers per day.

Once a device is located, the "render safe" mission begins. This mission is conducted using well-documented and well-rehearsed policies and procedures among all levels of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the FBI, and the Department of Defense. It is because

of National Nuclear Security Administration's equities in the U.S. nuclear weapons program that we provide the technical support for both the Federal Bureau of Investigation's and the Department of Defense's response teams. This support spans from nuclear design and materials training to the design and fabrication of specialized tools for accomplishing the render safe mission. Key to this effort is our technology integration and research and development programs where we develop and integrate new tools and techniques for device access and disablement.

In closing, I would like to say a few words about our emerging mission and role. With the launching of the new Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) by a Presidential Directive signed on April 15, 2005, DOE/ National Nuclear Security Administration and DHS/DNDO have been afforded new opportunities as well as challenges to enhance our Nation's nuclear detection and response programs. Through the same kind of interagency cooperation and coordination about which I have already spoken, we at the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration Emergency Operations Office are working with DHS/DNDO in the joint development of: (1) better overall technical integration among the operative agencies in the event of a domestic incident, (2) closer coordination and cooperation in technology development and research and development activities for enhancing our detection capabilities, and (3) better detection reporting and communication among the key stakeholders such as, for example, through the Joint Center for Global Connectivity.

Mr. Chairman, in concluding my statement, I would like to emphasize that since 9/11 we have made positive changes to improve our abilities to respond. What has not changed, however, is DOE/ National Nuclear Security Administration's continued close interagency working relationships and commitment to provide quality technical support for the nuclear/radiological counter-terrorism mission.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome your questions.